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This study aims to investigate the busy season contagion effects on other clients of the Big 4 auditor’s local office associated with the non-timely (NT) filing(s) by large accelerated filer (LAF) client(s) of the office. Specifically, the authors examine the influence such events have on the audit quality and timeliness of other clients of that office.

Using panel data of annual NT filings of LAF clients between 2006 and 2019, the authors apply the ordinary least squares regression technique to model audit reporting lag (ARL) and the logistic regression technique to model the probability of restatements.

Controlling for audit firm, industry and year-fixed effects, the authors find that a LAF NT filing reduces audit quality and audit timeliness of other clients of the office, as measured by restatement risk and ARL. The impact on ARL is most pronounced on the medium and small clients within the office. The deteriorated audit quality is observed for medium clients.

The results of this study have practical implications for auditors and regulators. They reveal the contagion effect in the auditor’s local office with the NT LAF client. The main limitation of the study is the lack of staffing utilization data to allow for drawing conclusions on causality.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to document the contagion effect of NT filings of LAF clients conducted at the auditor’s local office level.

The paper aims to explore the impact of two types of monitoring mechanisms, namely, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters (CLs) and short sellers, on management’s demand for audit quality.

Using information on the short interest positions and a panel data of SEC CLs between 2005 and 2015, this study applies logit regression model to estimate the likelihood of hiring Big 4 and industry expert audit firm. This study also applies an ordinary least squares regression technique to estimate audit fees.

Consistent with disclosure and agency theories, results from empirical analyses provide that management demands higher quality audits measured by higher audit fees, and higher likelihood to hire Big 4 and industry expert audit firm. However, this study finds that the effect varies depending on the specific monitoring mechanisms. Additionally, when both monitoring mechanisms are in place, the SEC CLs drive the overall direction of the demand for audit quality when audit demand is captured by propensity to hire Big 4/industry expert audit firm.

This study provides researchers with enhanced understanding of the factors having effect on the demand side for audit quality. Furthermore, it adds to the stream of literature on economic consequences of SEC CLs and short selling.

To the best of authors’ knowledge, this is the first comprehensive study to document the effect of two types of monitoring mechanisms, namely, SEC CLs and short selling, on the demand for audit quality.